Gulf

2024-05-07

A report in Al-Ain media in the UAE claimed to reveal an interesting development in Yemen. The report claims that Hezbollah has “confiscated” funds in Yemen from the Houthis and that Hezbollah is playing a role in Yemen. The report leaves many questions that are impossible to confirm, but it likely reveals some details that are worth analyzing. First of all, it reflects a concern in and the Gulf about the increased ties of the Houthis to Iran and other Iranian proxies. It reflects concern that the Houthis are being operationalized to do proxy work for Iran. Iran has been active in backing the Houthis in their war on Saudi Arabia since 2015 when Saudi Arabia and other countries intervened in Yemen to prevent the Houthis from taking Aden. There was a ceasefire in Yemen in 2022, and Saudi Arabia and the Houthis appeared to be on a track toward peace because Riyadh and Tehran were patching things up with China’s backing. Now, the Houthis have directed resources to join Hamas in the war against Israel. The Houthis are playing their role by attacking ships. This raises concerns about how Iran may use the Houthis in the future. The report at Al-Ain says that the news organization learned that the Houthi militias received "directives from Hezbollah to allocate the largest portion of the financial revenues it earns from the Yemeni governorates in the north to military operations and military industrialization." Hezbollah in Lebanon apparently now supervises some of what the Houthis are doing and works as a “mastermind” behind operations. “The sources revealed that Hezbollah addressed the militia leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, by transferring the process of managing the financial resources that the Houthi militias earn from revenues, royalties, and taxes from areas under their control to a special committee headed by one of Hezbollah’s experts present in Sanaa, whose nickname is ‘Abu Radwan.’” The name Abu Radwan, if it’s real and not just a made-up name, is possibly linked to the , who are portrayed as the elite force of Hezbollah. The Radwan force takes its name from the late Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyeh who was known as al-Hajj Radwan. This was his “war name” or nom de guerre. The fact that a mysterious man in Yemen who is linked to Hezbollah has taken on the name Abu Radwan is entirely plausible, but it’s only plausible in the context of knowing who the original Hajj Radwan was and what is meant by Radwan in the Hezbollah lingo. Armed Houthi followers ride on the back of a pick-up truck during a parade in solidarity with the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and to show support to Houthi strikes on ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, in Sanaa, Yemen January 29, 2024. (credit: KHALED ABDULLAH/REUTERS) The article claims that Abu Radwan in Yemen is now “supervising the revenues of the communications and Internet sector under the control of the Houthis.” But not only that, he has done this for years and was linked to Hezbollah for years. He is “directly linked to the leadership of Hezbollah and experts from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to finance military activities and arming the militias.” Hezbollah now plays a greater role in deciding where the Houthis allocate funds. A committee now exists that received input from Hezbollah about where to target financial resources and “how the process of military spending and armament will be carried out.” There is some kind of cheeky irony in this story because the article claims the source said that the goal of Hezbollah in Sinai is to kind of put the Houthi leadership on a diet of finances, “ending the extensive financial privileges enjoyed by the Houthi leadership, including military and security, drying up corruption, transferring funds for the benefit of military operations, and preparing for any future developments." In essence, Hezbollah has been brought in to bring some austerity here and clean up the Houthi books. The Houthis are like one of those large corporations like Office Space, and someone has to come in as efficiency experts and ask the Houthis, “What exactly do you do here”? At the same time, it seems Hezbollah has sought to squeeze the populace by sending taskmasters to go out and farm more money for the bosses in Sanaa. “The sources confirmed that Hezbollah asked the Houthi militias to intensify the financial collection process and raise the rates of customs, taxes, port fees, and communications costs by no less than 40% during the coming months until the end of the current year.” And it gets worse if you’re a Yemeni who thought peace might bring a peace dividend. It turns out Hezbollah wants a 70/30 split in terms of where the money goes. Seventy percent for guns and only thirty percent for food. This “guns or butter” equation is not in favor of what is good for Yemen. However, the article reveals the reason for this squeeze. It turns out that the Houthis are not getting as much money from Iraq or Iran, or perhaps Hezbollah is not getting as much from Iraq and Iraq. A new “council of experts” has been formed in Sana’a, and it has been “granted absolute powers for military and security decisions, controlling even the civilian sector, carrying out bombing or targeting operations inside and outside Yemen’s borders, and even naval attacks against cargo ships.” According to the report, this council is now in charge of military operations, and the Houthi's own ministry of defense has been sidelined. If this is true, it points to outsourcing some operations in Yemen to Hezbollah. It’s not the first that has been heard of Iran’s IRGC playing a role in overseeing Houthi actions, but it is the first time Hezbollah’s role has appeared so prominent. It is also known that in early October, after the Hamas attack, the Houthis created a “joint operations room” to coordinate with the rest of the Iranian axis to threaten Israel. Now, it seems this has grown into this “council” and taxation committee. If the report is accurate, then it spells more troubles in the region as Hezbollah grows in its role within the Iranian hierarchy. ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-05-06

Iran tried to use a meeting of the (OIC) convened in Banjul, The Gambia, on May 4 and 5, in order to advance its agenda. In general, the meeting did include a declaration supporting the Palestinians. However, that was to be expected. According to a report at the SPA, “the summit culminated in the Banjul Declaration, in which OIC leaders reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to the organization's core principles and objectives, which encompass respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, non-interference in internal affairs, and peaceful resolution of disputes, as well as to the noble values of Islam: unity, brotherhood, peace, solidarity, compassion, tolerance, equality, justice, moderation, balance, and human dignity.”  This was general language. However, the meeting did include a statement in which the countries “expressed solidarity with the people of Gaza Strip, condemning the over-six-month-old Israeli aggression and its devastating humanitarian impact. OIC leaders urged the international community to take immediate steps to stop the Israeli occupation's crime of genocide in the Gaza Strip.”  Reports in the Gulf highlighted this declaration. The leaders at the meeting also said they would work with the “and make every effort to accelerate the arrival of all humanitarian aid and reject any attempts to displace the Palestinian people from their land." The meeting did not produce a lot of outbursts against Israel, as some similar types of summits have in the past. For instance, in 2003, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohammed, used a summit to bash Israel and claim that Jews “rule the world by proxy.”  At the time, he said, "We are actually very strong, 1.3 billion people cannot be simply wiped out. The Europeans killed 6 million Jews out of 12 million. But today, the Jews rule the world by proxy. They get others to fight and die for them.”US Secretary of State Antony Blinken meets with foreign ministers from the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Arab League, to discuss the future of Gaza, at the State Department in Washington, US, December 8, 2023. (credit: REUTERS/EVELYN HOCKSTEIN)  Today, the OIC wants a ceasefire in Gaza. The meeting in Gambia came on the eve of Israel’s decision to call for residents of eastern Rafah to evacuate. Iran’s foreign minister attended the meetings in Gambia and sought to gain influence with meetings with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Indonesia.  Egypt has ties to Israel, but Saudi Arabia and Indonesia do not. Iran wanted to use the meeting to influence several countries against Israel, likely believing that Saudi Arabia or Indonesia might be considering normalization with Israel.  The rest of the declaration from the meeting included boilerplate language that was to be expected. For instance the countries condemned anti-Muslim incidents in Europe. They called for countries to “address the disturbing growth of the phenomenon of Islamophobia and all forms of fanaticism, terrorism, violence and extremism leading to violence, racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and discrimination of all kinds on the basis of ethnicity, tribe, color and religion.” The countries also called for “alleviating the burden of poverty, climate change, food security, health and education.”  ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-05-02

Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh stayed longer than usual in Turkey when he visited in mid-April along with a large Hamas delegation. It’s not the first time Hamas leaders have been greeted in Turkey with fanfare by Turkey’s president. Ankara has long backed Hamas and hosted its delegations over the years. Hamas has been hosted by US major non-NATO ally Qatar since 2012, and the West has supported its allies hosting Hamas, which is an inconvenient aspect of the H. Hamas is backed by two Western allies and carried out the largest mass murder of Jews since the Holocaust. Hamas is unlikely to move completely from one Western ally to another because it receives more protection by being hosted for high-level meetings by both Ankara and Doha. However, there is now speculation in Israeli media about whether the Haniyeh meetings and his subsequent stay in Turkey for several days symbolize more to come. This comes amid months of rumors that from Qatar, where it has been hosted since 2012. The rumors about Hamas seeking to extend its stay in Turkey came from a report at Asharq al-Awsat. The report was then re-reported in Maariv and other media. “Sources close to Hamas told the newspaper that the purpose of the visit to Istanbul is to discuss Turkey's role as a debating country and Ankara's role after the war. According to the sources, Hamas does not want to cause further embarrassment to Qatar, and its officials would prefer to leave and reduce the pressure.” In another report, a senior Hamas official claimed the group would relocate to Jordan if it were asked to leave Qatar. Al-Arabiya noted that Hamas official “Mousa Abu Marzouk insisted that any talk of Hamas leaders leaving Qatar is currently unfounded, but said that Jordan could serve as an alternative destination.” The report also noted that “Doha was asked by Washington to host them.” The Hamas official said, “All this talk about Hamas’ departure from Qatar is worthless,” in an interview with the al-Alam news channel. Iran's Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian meets with Palestinian group Hamas' top leader, Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar December 20, 2023. (credit: IRAN'S FOREIGN MINISTRY/WANA (WEST ASIA NEWS AGENCY)/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS) On April 20, The Wall Street Journal reported that “Hamas’s political leadership is looking to move from its current base in Qatar, as US legislators build pressure on the Gulf state to deliver on cease-fire negotiations that look likely to fail.” The article in the Journal made it appear that if Hamas was asked to leave Doha, then it could “upend delicate talks to free dozens of Israeli hostages held captive in Gaza and likely make it more difficult for Israel and the US to pass messages to a group designated by Washington as a terrorist organization. Hamas leaders have lived in Doha, the Qatari capital, since 2012 in an arrangement supported by the US” That report said that Hamas could consider Oman as a possible destination. Understanding how Hamas and Doha handle messaging on this issue is important. Prior to October 7, Israel and the West were told that having Hamas hosted in Qatar, and also having it welcomed in NATO member Turkey, would moderate Hamas. The messaging was that diplomacy and engagement would lead to stability. However, Hamas stockpiled masses of weapons in Gaza and built hundreds of miles of tunnels, becoming exponentially more powerful in the decade and a half its members were greeted and hosted in Doha and Ankara. Hamas received support from Iran and has also had high-level meetings in Russia, but it is the fact that it has friends in high places among Western allies that gave Hamas the comfort to feel that it had the impunity to carry out October 7. In addition Israel was lured into a sense that Hamas was deterred prior to October 7 because it seemed implausible a group hosted by western allies would ever carry out such a massive terror attack. Israel believed the Hezbollah and Iranian proxy threats were worse than Hamas because Hamas has a foot in both camps, it is both backed by Iran and also friendly with western allies. One could argue that Hamas has had tacit or indirect Western backing over the decades. For instance, many Western NGOs partner with Hamas in Gaza and describe its police and its role as bringing “law and order” to Gaza. How those same NGOs square that with images of the dead body of Shani Louk being paraded through the streets by their Hamas partners on October 7 is unclear. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that Western NGOs see Hamas as “law and order” in Gaza, preferable to the “chaos” of not having Hamas. Hamas gunmen are often seen taking over aid trucks in Gaza in coordination with humanitarian aid groups. This leads us back to the question of whether Hamas would relocate from Doha. Doha’s messaging today is that any relocation would jeopardize the hostages. However, since Hamas violated the first hostage deal on December 1, no more deals have taken place. The messaging by Hamas is clear. Prior to October 7 it was “deterred” and having it hosted by western allies supposedly enabled Israel and the West to “engage” with it and prevent war. Then Hamas carried out the worst attack in Israel’s history, and the messaging shifted to assert that Hamas must be hosted by Western allies in order to do hostage deals, deals that never seem to happen. The messaging from Hamas is that they want a deal to remain in Gaza, to get numerous of their murderous prisoners back, and then have impunity to carry out more attacks. Hamas enjoys impunity primarily because it has the cover of Western allies. Jordan or Oman do not give it a similar cover. Hamas leaders such as Khaled Meshaal were once located in Jordan, but even the Kingdom found hosting them was not helpful. Hamas has spent four decades spreading terror and undermining peace, so why would a wise country like Jordan want to host them? After all, it is Hamas that was responsible for harming peace during the Oslo years, increasing bus bombings, and then illegally taking over Gaza in 2007 and ejecting the Jordanian-backed and Western-backed Palestinian Authority. Oddly, the West decided to play both sides, as they also did in Afghanistan. They trained the Palestinian Authority Security Forces, but they hedged their bets by being open to their allies hosting Hamas. Hamas, through being hosted by Western allies, became exponentially stronger since 2012. Its rockets, which once only flew a few kilometers, and its once small tunnels grew into monstrous proportions, openly, with the West watching it happen. Doha became a major non-NATO ally of the US, hosting Hamas and the Taliban. The Taliban were brought back to power in Kabul in 2021. It appears that major non-NATO ally status was a reward for hosting these groups. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others who are partners of the West got increasingly the cold shoulder; the more they cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood, the more they didn’t want to host Hamas, and the more they embraced peace with Israel. The message is clear for Hamas. It grew exponentially powerful and wealthy through Western allies. Iran may have supplied the know-how for the missiles and weapons, but the wealth and impunity for attacks and cover against war crimes prosecution comes through Western allies. This is why Hezbollah today faces more challenges than Hamas because it is a Shi’ite sectarian-based Iranian proxy. Hamas is setting its sights on the West Bank to take over when PA President Mahmoud Abbas passes. As such, it will want the backing of Ankara, Doha, and the West when it seeks power in Ramallah. If Hamas is relegated to only being backed by Iran or stuck in a place like Oman, it won’t be able to swoop into control of the West Bank after the Gaza war eventually ends. The long game for Ankara and Doha, and their Western allies, is to have a foothold in Gaza and the West Bank via Hamas. Hamas understands this and knows that it is sometimes used as a tool for larger agendas, and it exploits that to carry out massacres such as October 7. There are no other cases of Western allies hosting terrorist groups who massacre thousands of people and take hundreds of hostages, including citizens of Western countries. Al-Shabab or Boko Haram don’t get the red carpet in meetings in Turkey. Hamas, due to its Muslim Brotherhood roots, its important role in Palestinian politics, and its war against Israel, is hosted by Western allies because both the West and Western allies have an interest in keeping Hamas corralled in their corner and not just a pariah group backed by Iran. This has been a disaster for the Gaza, but the interests are larger than Gaza. ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-05-01

Sheikh Meshaal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the Emir of Kuwait was in Cairo on Tuesday where he met with Egyptian President . It was the Kuwaiti leader’s first official visit to Egypt after assuming his position as Emir. Egypt invited the Emir for the visit. Egypt and Kuwait have positive ties and relations and there are an estimated 700,000 Egyptians living in Kuwait, the UAE-based Al-Ain media reports. In addition around 20,000 Kuwaitis study and live in Egypt. Egypt and Kuwait are both concerned about a looming Israeli, the southern Gaza city controlled by Hamas on the Egyptian border. Kuwait generally has hostile views of Israel, more hostile than other Gulf states, whereas Egypt has peace with Israel. The two countries say they are worried about the “dire humanitarian consequences if Israel launches an attack on the city of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip,” Al-Ain’s report says. The two countries issued a call for a ceasefire. These kinds of calls are pro-forma, a ritual in these kinds of state visits. The call for a ceasefire included calls for “facilitating safe, adequate and sustainable access for humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people in the occupied territory and implementing relevant Security Council resolutions.” The countries discussed other issues as well. “In the final statement, the two sides stressed the necessity of establishing an international mechanism within the Gaza Strip to facilitate the entry of humanitarian aid into the Strip, stressing their rejection of Israel’s continuation of its military operations, including the possibility of its extension to the Palestinian city of Rafah, and warning of the dire humanitarian consequences that would result from such a step,” the report said. A view of tents set up for displaced Palestinians amid fears of Israeli ground offensive on Rafah, as the conflict between Israel and Hamas continues, in al-Mawasi area in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, April 25, 2024. (credit: REUTERS/Ramadan Abed) is being increased to Gaza, via numerous new channels. There are air drops, there is aid coming from Jordan, there is aid that arrives from Egypt, there is support from the Gulf, France and other countries via Al-Arish in Egypt and also via Jordan; there is a new maritime corridor from Cyprus to Ashdod, there is a new northern entrance to the Gaza strip for aid, and the US is building a floating pier off the coast of Gaza. Hundreds of trucks cross daily into Gaza. However, there is concern that an IDF operation in Rafah might disrupt some of this and also cause many Gazans to flee Rafah, an area they already fled to when leaving northern Gaza in October and November after the Hamas attack and massacre of October 7. Egypt and Kuwait’s leaders said they were concerned that an operation in Rafah might lead to escalation or expand the conflict and risk stability in the region. “The two sides appreciated the close coordination on regional and international issues of common interest and stressed the need to give priority to the culture of peace, dialogue, and diplomatic settlement of disputes and differences in the Middle East region, in order to achieve development and peaceful coexistence among its countries, in a manner consistent with the values of tolerance, respect for the sovereignty of states over their territories, and non-interference in their affairs,” Al-Ain reported. Once again, this is a boilerplate statement and very common for these types of meetings. Of interest, the two sides “stressed the importance of the security and stability of navigation in the region's waterways in accordance with the provisions of international law and international conventions, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, in order to guarantee the freedom and smoothness of navigation and provide security and stability therein.” This is a clear reference to the Iran-backed Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, attacks that harm trade that passes via the Red Sea and Suez and harms Egypt. As such it is clear that Egypt appears to be upping its rhetoric in this regard. Kuwait knows well the importance of free navigation of the seas because Iran, the large neighbor of Kuwait, has threatened shipping in the Gulf. In addition, during the Iran-Iraq war, tankers had to be re-flagged during the so-called “Tanker war” in which Iran and Iraq attacked commercial vessels. The US intervened in the tanker war to protect Kuwaiti tankers in 1986. The US carried out operations against Iran. Later, Iraq under Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, drawing the US into the Gulf War. That war set in motion much of the modern Middle East as we know it. For instance, the Scud threat to Israel led to the deployment of Patriots in Israel. Palestinians, who backed Saddam’s invasion, were expelled from Kuwait after it was liberated. Osama Bin Laden claimed to be enraged about US forces stationed in Saudi Arabia and this led him increasingly toward anti-American extremism and the road to 9/11. Egypt played a key role in the Gulf War. Under Hosni Mubarak, Egypt attempted to mediate the crisis in 1990 prior to Saddam’s invasion. Saddam betrayed Mubarak after a meeting in Jeddah where Egypt sought to broker peace via the Arab League. Egypt then joined the coalition to expel Saddam. ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-30

The have increased their attacks over the last several days. The terrorist group said on Tuesday that they “targeted two American destroyers and two ships in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.” The spokesman for the group said they used drones to target the US ships. This comes after a month or more in which it appeared Houthi attacks had either been reduced or plateaued. US Central Command said on April 29, “Between 10:00 am and 5:20 pm (Sanaa time) on April 29, Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists fired three anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) and three UAVs from Yemen into the Red Sea towards MV Cyclades, a Malta-flagged, Greece-owned vessel. Initial reports indicate there were no injuries, and the vessel continued on its way.” The new attacks are raising eyebrows in the region. They were front-page news at the pro-Iran Al-Mayadeen news, and this shows that Iran and its proxies view the latest attacks as important moves for the Iran-backed “axis of resistance.” Iran has been continuing to push to carry out attacks on Israel. For instance, terrorists in both Lebanon and Gaza have targeted Israel with rockets in recent days. The Houthis are a third front where Iran seeks to escalate attacks. The Al-Ain media in the Gulf said that “new naval attacks were carried out by Houthi militias against American cargo ships and destroyers, extending from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.” The report said that the Houthi spokesperson, Yahya Saree, said that the militias carried out a series of attacks that targeted the "Israeli ship MSC Orion," the "Cyclades" ship, and two American destroyers, according to his statement. The Iranian-backed groups often claimed to attack Israeli ships or Israel-linked ships without providing evidence of the connection or claim. We reported overnight at The Jerusalem Post that the Portugal-flagged MSC Orion was sailing between the ports in Sines, Portugal and Salalah, Oman and its registered owner is Zodiac Maritime, according to LSEG data. A Tribesman loyal to the Houthis mans a machine gun mounted on a pick-up truck during a military parade for new tribal recruits amid escalating tensions with the U.S.-led coalition in the Red Sea, in Bani Hushaish, Yemen January 22, 2024. (credit: KHALED ABDULLAH/REUTERS) The report goes on to claim that the attack on the MSC Orion took place in the Indian Ocean. This is also an escalation because the Houthis have often concentrated attacks in the Red Sea and carried out attacks in the Indian Ocean, which expands their area of operation. The report at Al-Ain media said that the Houthis had “confirmed that the hit on the Cyclades ship came after an attack targeted it in the Red Sea.” The Cyclades sails under the flag of Malta, reports said. It was targeted with drones and missiles for "violating the ban and heading to the port of Eilat on April 21, using deception and camouflage, under the pretense that it was heading to another port,” the report claimed, based on the Houthi claimed. In addition, the Houthis are escalating attacks on US ships. The US ships have been trying to prevent Houthi attacks over the last five months. The ships come under US Central Command’s overall mission to secure shipping and avoid regional destabilization. “Last week, the Houthi militia claimed responsibility for targeting the Andromeda Star ship in the Red Sea and shooting down an American drone in its home stronghold of Saada, in the far north of Yemen,” Al-Ain noted. The same report said that the Houthis had targeted the MSC Darwin sailing in the Gulf of Aden, the American ship Maersk Yorktown and an American destroyer in the Gulf of Aden, and the “Israeli ship MSC VERACRUZ in the Indian Ocean.” The Houthis have now attacked 102 ships, the Houthis claim. They also claim to be expanding operations in the Indian Ocean. The Houthis put out a video message about this claim. There was no immediate elaboration on these incidents, however the Houthi claims clearly show how they want to appear to be increasing their attacks. On April 29, US Central Command said that their forces “successfully engaged and destroyed one Houthi launched airborne unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) on a flight path towards USS Philippine Sea and USS Laboon in the Red Sea. No injuries or damages were reported by US, coalition, or merchant vessels.” On April 28, the US said, “between 1:48 and 2:27 a.m. (Sanaa time), On April 28, the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) successfully engaged five airborne unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) over the Red Sea. It was determined the UAVs presented an imminent threat to US, coalition, and merchant vessels in the region. These actions are taken to protect freedom of navigation and make international waters safer and more secure for US, coalition, and merchant vessels.” ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-29

Iran is seeking greater influence, via , in Africa, two new reports claim. The assertion, at the UAE-based Al-Ain media, describes how Iran is “is expanding its footprint in Africa, offering a recipe for weapons, trade partnerships and chaos to enhance its .” It is using the current global chaos unleashed as a result of events such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the war in Gaza to achieve this. It is also adding “new lines of influence from Sudan,” the report says. The report builds on an earlier investigation by Radio Free Europe (RFE) on April 23 which first examined this trend. “Iran is expanding its footprint in Africa, offering arms, partnerships, and chaos as it works to boost its influence on the continent,” RFE noted. “This week, Iran is touting the second Iran-Africa trade summit in just over a year, with representatives from more than 40 African countries expected for the April 26-29 event in Tehran,” the RFE article said. It focused on Iran’s role in Niger and Sudan. The UAE’s media interest illustrates that Iran’s expansion raises eyebrows in the Gulf. It examines this trend amid reports that Iran also drew-down forces in Syria. An Iranian official was quoted saying “the future of global trade will be determined in Africa,” according to Iran’s Mehr Agency. An Iranian woman walks past an anti-Israel banner with a picture of Iranian missiles on a street in Tehran, Iran April 19, 2024. (credit: MAJID ASGARIPOUR/WANA (WEST ASIA NEWS AGENCY) VIA REUTERS) All the ingredients in Africa are present for enabling Iran’s exploitation of the scene. Iran preys on chaos and establishes long-term investment in local networks. This is how it operationalized the Houthis in Yemen. It also seeks to establish proxy groups. Iran is also expanding relationships in Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti. “Iranian weapons sales to Sudan's armed forces, which are fighting a civil war against rebels, have recently allowed the military to reverse losses and regain territory,” RFE noted. The export of Iranian drones to Sudan has been in the spotlight over the last months, for instance. “Iran seeks, by providing such assistance to the Sudanese Armed Forces, to strengthen its presence on the African continent and carve out an area of influence for it,” Al-Ain noted. Both reports focus on Iran’s role across the Sahel from Sudan to Niger. Niger has sought to shift its links from the West to countries like Russia and Iran. Tehran wants to fill the vacuum left by the West, as it has done elsewhere. “Iran signed several cooperation agreements with Burkina Faso in the fields of energy, urban planning, higher education, and construction,” the Al-Ain report said. Iran has also sought to expand influence in Mali. The in Africa has been clear for years. In many cases Iran already had ties with regimes such as Sudan and they are merely trying to keep those ties. However, they also want to exploit the apparent weakening of the West to move into new areas of influence. Towards that end they see opportunities in places like Niger. The wider picture is Iran’s attempt to use the Gaza war and its ties with Russia to build a new regional and global world order. Africa is one area it is active, but it is also active in Central Asia and other regions.  ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-28

Qatar has emerged as a pivotal mediator between Israel and Hamas in the ongoing conflict between the two parties. Even as , the Gulf state has also been accused of promoting anti-Israeli and antisemitic narratives through official remarks, reporting from Qatari-owned news outlet Al Jazeera, and the financial support of protest movements. Experts say that this seeming contradiction is part of Doha’s foreign policy strategy, characterized by playing all sides while prioritizing its own interests. told Israel’s Kan News over the weekend that the hostages were in increasing danger with each passing day without an agreement, attributing the delays to “narrow political considerations.” He expressed Qatar’s dissatisfaction with the commitment levels of both Israel and Hamas, stating, “Both Israel and Hamas can do more to reach a deal now.” He revealed that Qatar was reconsidering its role in mediation due to doubts about the seriousness of the involved parties. “We are doing all that we can right now, and we need more pressure on both sides in order to reach a deal,” he said. On Monday, Essa Al-Nassr, a member of the legislative council, the Consultative Assembly of Qatar, addressed an Arab League session. His remarks led to accusations of antisemitism and incitement to violence and terrorism. “There will be no peace nor negotiations with the for one reason: because their mentality does not recognize negotiations, but rather only … breaking promises and lying. … They only recognize one thing, which is killings, since they are killers of prophets,” he said, repeating a common antisemitic trope. Despite remarks such as these, and despite Qatar’s involvement in spreading an anti-Israel narrative across US university campuses and on mainstream and social media, Qatar remains a central mediator between Israel and Hamas. Hamas parade in Gaza (credit: REUTERS/Ahmed Jadallah AJ/TZ) “Qatar is perceived in Israel as a reasonable mediator, as an actor that actually can bring results to the table,” Ariel Admoni, Qatar researcher and doctoral candidate at Israel’s Bar-Ilan University, told The Media Line. From the American and Israeli perspective, Admoni said, antisemitic remarks and anti-Israel advocacy from Qatar are seen as “the cost of doing business.” He said that Qatar pursues anti-Israel activism as a way to please the public and attract attention. Despite that activism, Israel sees Qatar as the actor most poised to broker a deal to bring back the hostages. Omri Brinner, a UK-based geopolitical and terror financing consultant and a research fellow at the International Team for the Study of Security in Verona, Italy, told The Media Line that Qatar is Israel’s only viable option as a mediator since Qatar has full access to Hamas’ leadership and significant leverage over Hamas. “While Qatar is a sympathizer of the Muslim Brotherhood and of Islamic regimes, it also wishes to maintain and strengthen its status as a legitimate and moderate actor,” he said. Some other possible mediators, such as Egypt and Turkey, do not hold the same strategic weight Qatar does, Brinner said. Both countries are significantly poorer than Qatar, he explained. Beyond that, “Turkey is too anti-Israeli to be trusted to be an honest broker by Israel, and Egypt is too anti-Hamas to be considered as an honest broker by Hamas,” he said. Qatar is seen to promote some Israeli interests despite the country’s antisemitic and anti-Israel advocacy, allowing it to come across as an honest broker. “I can describe the relations as poisonous symbiotic relations,” Brinner said. Admoni explained that Qatar does not see a contradiction between its promotion of anti-Israel narratives and its choice to maintain relations with Israel. “Al Jazeera, antisemitic remarks, and terror funding are just the other side of the coin of Qatari foreign policy, to attract attention, to be an influencer in the region,” he said. “Qatar’s claim, which makes perfect sense, is that it is playing with both sides to secure its existence,” Brinner said, attributing this strategy to Qatar’s vulnerability in the region. He explained that Doha aims to position itself as an indispensable actor for both sides, aiming to maintain relations with the pro-stability coalition led by Saudi Arabia—which includes the UAE, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority—as well as the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, which includes the Syrian regime, Hizbullah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shia militias in Iraq, and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories. “Qatar, despite its wealth, is a tiny country in a highly volatile and contested area. It can be crushed in a day by the larger forces in the region,” Brinner said. Qatar’s attempt to become indispensable to the countries around it is part of an effort to secure its future, he explained. Admoni described Qatari foreign policy as “a sophisticated game.” “It’s all done at the same time,” he said, noting that while Qatar is mediating between Israel and Hamas, the emir visited Nepal and Bangladesh and the finance minister met with high-ranking officials in the US banking system. Qatar is not committed to any side, he explained. “They are committed only to themselves,” he stressed. According to Brinner, Qatar’s confidence in its strategy of playing all sides was bolstered after the Gulf Cooperation Council lifted its blockade on Qatar in 2021, leaving Qatar with the upper hand. Brinner said that Qatar is likely not the party to blame for the lack of a permanent cease-fire and hostage-release deal. “Both Israel and Hamas believe they can improve their positions dramatically, so neither side is willing to make compromises that would suffice for the other side. I don’t think there’s a better mediator on the state level,” he said. Admoni, on the other hand, said that Qatar’s two-faced foreign policy might be part of the problem. “We can see the fact that during the negotiation, Qatar talked with Israeli officials, but at the same time attacked them in press conferences,” he said. He also noted that Qatari news outlets are attacking the US relentlessly, even as the US and Qatar seem to have grown closer than ever. “Qatar takes care only for itself and for that reason, I think that some of the actors in the region don’t like the Qatari attitude,” he said, pointing out that Tunisia lately refused financial aid from Doha. “Maybe this is the reason that they weren’t able to bring more results in terms of a hostage deal,” he said, he said, noting that while the Qatari approach occasionally succeeds, there is a false belief in Israel and the US that Qatar completely controls Hamas and can dictate its actions. “Many Hamas officials will not simply follow Qatar’s wishes,” he observed. He pointed to Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas chief in the Gaza Strip, as an example; Sinwar shows appreciation for Qatar’s financial support but does not always comply with its directives. “Reports over the years have indicated that Sinwar and Qatar often clashed. Similarly, other Hamas officials have had disagreements with Qatar,” he continued. ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-21

Iran's Student News Network reported on Saturday that Iran would be receiving a shipment of fighter jets from Russia next week, but later deleted the report and said that it was false. In November, Russian and Iranian officials announced that Russia was delivering Yak-130 trainers, Su-35 fighters, and Mi-28 helicopters to Iran but added that the process was "ongoing." It remains unclear if any Su-35 fighter jets were ever actually delivered. The Kuwaiti Al-Jarida newspaper reported last week that Iran had already received some Su-35 fighter jets about a year ago but was unable to operate them due to a lack of certain parts. According to the report, Russia was delaying delivering the necessary parts due to a "veto" from Gulf states and Israel and due to Russian demands for Iran to supply Russia with more missiles and drones for the war in Ukraine. Iran's Army chief Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi and Defense Minister Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani visit a drone site at an undisclosed location in Iran, in this handout image obtained on April 20, 2023. (credit: IRANIAN ARMY/WANA/REUTERS) Russia and Iran have been since Russia's invasion of Ukraine began and since the October 7th Massacre. Iran has provided Russia with several shipments of and helped Russia set up production facilities to produce Iranian-designed drones in the country. An airstrike attributed by foreign media reports to Israel targeted an S-300 antiaircraft battery near Isfahan in central Iran on Friday morning. The S-300 system was provided to Iran by Russia. ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-20

The political leadership mulls moving its base of operations out of Qatar, The Wall Street Journal reported Saturday. It is understood the Gulf state is increasingly pressurizing the terror chiefs to accept a hostage-for-truce deal with Israel. The report quoted an unnamed Middle Eastern official as saying the Hamas poliburo chiefs were mulling a move to Oman. “The talks have already stalled again with barely any signs or prospects for them to resume any time soon, and distrust is rising between Hamas and the negotiators,” the source was quoted as saying. “The possibility of the talks being upended entirely is very real,” said another Arab official told WSJ. ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-20

The political leadership mulls moving its base of operations out of Qatar, The Wall Street Journal reported. It is understood the Gulf state is increasingly pressurizing the terror chiefs to accept a hostage-for-truce deal with Israel. The Wall Street Journal quoted an unnamed Middle Eastern official as saying the Hamas poliburo chiefs were mulling a move to Oman. Meanwhile Ismail Haniyeh, the top Hamas official in Qatar, will meet with Turkey’s Islamist president Recep Tayyip Erdogan later on Saturday.   🚨Alert sirens sound in northern Israel   Both Israel and U.S. deny being behind overnight strikes on Iraq. ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-18

On April 13 and 14, Iran executed its first direct attack on Israel amid the current conflict, starkly underscoring the fragile security environment that surrounds us. This very date marks a personal and poignant anniversary for me as well; eight years prior, I embarked on my first journey to the Dead Sea, drawn by its haunting beauty and environmental plight, aboard a unique boat excursion at the earth’s lowest point. In my role as a foreign relations manager at ISRAEL-is, aimed at improving Israel’s global image post-October 7 atrocities, the sight of an intercepted Iranian missile plunging into the Dead Sea reignited my dedication to addressing both environmental and security challenges in our region. This 750 kg. warhead missile, a vivid symbol of aggression, not only opens a new drastic chapter in the Middle East conflict, but also strikes a body of water that symbolizes both natural wonder and ecological fragility. Following the tumultuous aftermath of the Gaza war, the October 7 atrocities and Iran’s latest provocation, the security challenges facing Israel and its neighbors have only deepened. A significant display of regional dynamics unfolded as several missiles from Iran aimed at Israel and Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, and provided intelligence on the Iranian attack. This act of cooperation amidst conflict underscores the complex interplay of antagonism and alliance that characterizes our regional relations. Recalling the days leading up to October 7, there was a fleeting optimism about regional partnerships underpinning a brighter future. During this period, I walked the corridors of Capitol Hill with a delegation from the Middle East and North Africa, championing the third year of the Abraham Accords. My role then as the director of the involved advocating for water diplomacy and the development of environmental tourism—a dual strategy aimed at environmental preservation and fostering coexistence and unity among the peoples connected by shared ecological and cultural narratives, particularly focusing on water sustainability in one of the world’s driest regions. A view of the Dead Sea from Amman, Jordan. (credit: wallpaperflare) Today, as the shadow of escalating conflicts looms larger, the necessity for a regional security alliance against Iran becomes increasingly imperative. Yet, within these brewing tensions lies a critical opportunity for cooperation centered around our mutual environmental concerns. The declining waters of the Dead Sea serve as a stark reminder of the broader environmental challenges that defy political borders and demand collaborative action. Looking ahead, our focus must evolve from mere survival and tactical maneuvers to fostering sustainable cooperation. We are reminded that our shared water resources and environmental challenges could be the cornerstone of a robust regional alliance. Such cooperation does not merely address immediate ecological needs but also establishes the groundwork for a more stable and secure future. As we navigate these complex times, our unwavering commitment to environmental diplomacy and regional cooperation continues to strengthen. The stories of resilience from the Dead Sea to the diplomatic corridors illuminate the pressing need for a unified approach to both security and sustainability. These narratives reinforce the importance of leveraging shared environmental interests to bridge divides and forge lasting peace in the region.  The success of diplomatic efforts like the highlights the potent impact of cooperative strategies and underscores the critical need to engage communities and nations in dialogues about mutual interests and shared destinies. This comprehensive approach will not only counter the destructive ideologies of Iran and its proxies but also pave the way for a sustainable and peaceful future for all involved. The writer is foreign affairs manager for ISRAEL-is, and formerly served as director of the Dead Sea Revival Project. ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-17

Heavy thunderstorms and rainfall across the Gulf region resulted in flood alert warnings being issued across the area. In Oman 19 people died, at least one was reported in the United Arab Emirates and Dubai's main airport was partially out of service. The freak weather event began in Omon on Sunday, with high winds and heavy rain, an area that was quickly flooded swept away 10 schoolchildren in a vehicle with an adult driver, in addition to another eight deaths and others still missing. Still on Tuesday, Oman's national emergency authority said rain was expected to continue. While similar weather plagued neighboring Gulf countries. Heavy thunderstorms dumped over a year and a half's worth of rain on Dubai, according to The Associate Press. Central highways and the international airport were documented as flooded and mostly out of service. In Ras al-Khaimah, police said one 70-year-old man died when his vehicle was swept away by floodwater. In the UAE, the downpour began late Monday and 0.79 inches of rain was recorded at Dubai International Airport, while the storms only intensified on Tuesday with hail and rain. By Tuesday night, 5.59 inches were recorded in a single day compared to the 3.76 experienced in average cross an entire year. The metro saw disruptions, most schools were shut, and the Dubai International Airport ended up halting arrivals. This post can't be displayed because social networks cookies have been deactivated. You can activate them by clicking manage preferences. “Recovery will take some time,” the airport informed its travelers on X, explaining flight crews were unable to reach the aircraft and limited transportation options were available. Heavy rain also fell in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Some of whom experienced flooding, and forecasts expecting the rain to continue into Wednesday. ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-15

Pakistan and its neighboring countries, Iran and Afghanistan, along with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries, jubilantly observed the on Wednesday.  This festive holiday, which occurs the day after seeing the new moon of the lunar month of Shawwal, holds significant religious importance for Muslims worldwide as it commemorates the culmination of 29 or 30 days of dawn-to-sunset fasting throughout the month of Ramadan.  Pakistan's prime minister and president both extended their heartfelt congratulations to the nation while Eid al-Fitr prayers were offered across the country. Eid al-Fitr features a distinctive Salat (Islamic prayer), typically conducted in an open field or a spacious hall, with congregations gathering to participate.  In the capital, Islamabad, following prayers in the country's largest mosque, Faisal Mosque, Dr. Muhammad bin Abdul Karim Al-Essa, the Secretary General of the Islamic Association, delivered a special sermon.   But not everyone was joyous during this year's Eid al-Fitr. The majority of Pakistanis feel burdened by the relentless weight of inflation and have found their holiday joy dimmed by the pressing need and worries to pay utility and food bills. A woman is reflected in a mirror as she buys artificial jewelry from a shop ahead of the Eid al-Fitr celebrations in Peshawar, Pakistan April 8, 2024. (credit: REUTERS/FAYAZ AZIZ) With a population exceeding 220 million, Pakistan, South Asia’s largest Muslim country, is grappling with soaring inflation, which has reached its highest level in decades. Despite the monetary challenges facing most Pakistanis, specifically the lower class and daily wage earners, there exists a segment of society, known as the upper or elite class, that is untouched by concerns about rising prices, diesel costs, or steep utility bills. This well-off community often engages in extravagant shopping excursions ahead of the holidays. Leading up to this year's Eid al-Fitr festival, these elites visited high-end boutiques and luxury stores, indulging in purchases of upscale designer clothing, accessories, and jewelry. Their purchases reflect a desire for the latest fashion trends and exclusive designer collections to show off during Eid al-Fitr gatherings.  Moreover, they often indulge in lavish gifts for their loved ones and adorn their surroundings with extravagant decorations. Gourmet foods are also prepared to enhance the joy of Eid al-Fitr celebrations. E-7 is one of the stylish parts of Islamabad, known for its luxurious homes, boutique markets, shopping centers, and restaurants, which are all out of reach for the average Pakistani. Most of E-7's residents here are top government officials, businessmen, politicians, and even foreigners.  One E-7 resident, Shavez Ali Khan, is the offspring of a retired senior officer from Pakistan's foreign services. Khan attained his master’s degree in business administration from the . Now, he runs a well-settled import-export business in Islamabad and owns a restaurant.  Khan told The Media Line that he had ordered a special Eid al-Fitr dress for his wife from one of Pakistan's top fashion designers, “at a cost of approximately $2000.” He is hosting a grand feast for the business community at his home during the holiday, and renowned chefs from Islamabad and Lahore have been invited to prepare “a variety of sumptuous dishes.”  According to Khan, “Wealth bestowed by the Almighty should primarily be directed towards the well-being of oneself and one's family.” Another of Pakistani's elite is Rana Saeed Ali, a Faisalabad-based textile mill owner. Ali has two wives and children from both women. Each family resides in a separate luxury villa. “I ensured that my both families indulged in matchless luxury Eid shopping,” Ali told The Media Line. “We explored the most exclusive boutiques and designer outlets in Faisalabad and Lahore.” “We selected the finest designer clothing and jewelry for each member of my families, aiming to showcase their impeccable style,” Ali continued. “Furthermore, I also arranged for precious gifts to be delivered straight to our doorsteps, ranging from prestigious timepieces to elusive fragrances sourced from renowned global brands,” he added. Ali believes that “the Eid festival, besides teaching us to cherish moments with our families, presents an opportunity to support our impoverished and low-income relatives.”  Meanwhile, most of the rest of Pakistan cannot afford to engage in luxury during the holiday. The surge in inflation in Pakistan has hit families of salaried and middle-class individuals the hardest and has rendered Eid al-Fitr shopping immensely challenging. Whether it's clothing, footwear, cosmetics, bangles, or jewelry, the prices of all commodities have soared, leaving many distressed and disheartened.  Despite the transition to a new government, recent weeks have seen a surge in the prices of essential commodities such as electricity, gas, petrol, food, and clothing, thereby elevating the cost of daily necessities for the populace. With their purchasing power diminished and the cost of living continuing to soar, families have been forced to cut back on their usual celebratory Eid al-Fitr preparations, including preparing special meals and buying gifts for loved ones, which has dampened the festive spirit that typically accompanies Eid al-Fitr.  Many parents are finding it increasingly challenging yet necessary to find ways to ensure that their children can still experience some holiday joy. Muhammed Asad, a paramedic in a government-run hospital who visited Raja Bazaar in Rawalpindi with his wife, told The Media Line: “This time, compared to previous years. Really, we are unable to purchase anything for ourselves, but we have barely been able to buy new clothes and shoes for our children just to fulfill their  joyous expectations, as some essential items remain out of reach.”  Samreen Jan, a widow and mother of three daughters, one of whom is battling cancer, works as a cleaner to make ends meet. Echoing Asad's desperation, she told The Media Line: “With prices soaring, I can't even think about buying new clothes or making treats for the kids. I'm getting my daughter's expensive [cancer] treatment from some kind-hearted people, but I'm barely managing to pay the rent and bills despite working around the clock.”  Asad or Jan's story are not unusual; most of Pakistan's people suffer from similar economic hardships as well, largely because of policies that don't promote economic growth. According to the latest index of the Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based conservative think tank working on policy impact, “Pakistan’s economic freedom score is 49.5, making its economy the 147th freest in the 2024 Index of Economic Freedom. Pakistan is ranked 32nd out of 39 countries in the Asia-Pacific region.” “Pakistan’s economy is considered 'repressed', according to the 2024 Index,” the report further added. Saleh Mughul, a Rawalpindi-based analyst told The Media Line, “Despite promises of economic reform and development, the ruling elite's lack of genuine concern exacerbates the challenges faced by the populace, further widening the gap between the rich and the poor.” “Pakistan finds itself in a precarious economic predicament, with the situation deteriorating notably in recent years and showing no signs of immediate improvement,” he continued.  “The escalating inflationary pressures, coupled with structural deficiencies and policy shortcomings, pose significant challenges to the country's economic stability and growth prospects,” Mughul added, asserting that “as the nation grapples with these formidable obstacles, it becomes imperative for policymakers to address the root causes of economic distress and implement effective measures to alleviate the burden on the populace and steer the country towards a path of sustainable development and prosperity.” According to Hazar Khan Baluch, a Quetta-based analyst, “In a nation where poverty rates are already high and exacerbated by current economic challenges, it is imperative for the state to prioritize a fundamental aspect of policymaking and governance.”  Baluch underlined the “urgency for the government to initiate interest-free loan schemes tailored for unemployed youth and to swiftly adopt policies aimed at fostering the growth of small industries and entrepreneurship.” “Promoting small industries and entrepreneurship will not only create employment opportunities but also stimulate economic growth and innovation. Therefore, implementing such measures promptly is essential for addressing unemployment and fostering economic development in the country,” Baluch concluded.  ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-14

are pushing to stop a full-blown regional war after Iran's unprecedented retaliatory strikes on Israel, sources in the region said, fearing new escalation could put them on front lines of a conflagration and ruin plans to reshape the region. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in particular may be well placed to triangulate between Iran, Israel and the United States after diplomatic advances in recent years that benefited all those countries. Allies of Washington, Gulf monarchies have sought to stabilize ties with Iran and Israel to resolve longstanding security concerns and allow them to focus on national projects. The UAE and Bahrain signed a normalization deal with Israel in 2020 and Saudi Arabia was considering a similar agreement also involving a US defense pact until the Gaza war torpedoed diplomacy. Riyadh also buried the hatchet with Iran last year after years of feuding. However, the policy of detente now faces its greatest ever threat as the risk to wider regional peace raised by Israel's conflict with Iran-backed since October 7 comes to a head. A direct war between Israel and Iran could swiftly expand to Gulf states whose air space lies between the pair, and which host several military bases of the United States, which has vowed to defend its ally Israel. "Nobody wants an escalation. Everybody wants to contain the situation," said a Gulf source close to government circles, adding that there was probably wide telephone diplomacy under way. "The pressure is not on Iran alone. The pressure is now on Israel not to retaliate," said the source, adding that the fallout of an Israeli attack on key Iranian sites "will affect all the region." Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, meets with the family of one of the members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who were killed in the Israeli airstrike on the Iranian embassy complex in the Syrian capital Damascus, during a funeral ceremony in Tehran, Iran April 4, 2024. (credit: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS) Another Gulf source with knowledge of official thinking said Gulf states, Iraq and Jordan are pushing both Iran and Israel's main backer the United States not to escalate. Washington was already pressing Israel to show restraint, both sources said. At the same time, the was using Gulf countries to convey messages to Iran not to escalate any further, the source with knowledge of official thinking added. "It is clear that America is using Gulf Arab allies to convey messages between Iran and the Americans. Saudi Arabia is maintaining contacts with Iran and there is an understanding to contain things," the source said. Reuters has requested comment from both Saudi Arabia and the UAE on how they are handling the crisis.Still, both the sources as well as analysts in the Gulf believed the most dangerous moment may have passed. "The Iranians took their shot," said Abdulaziz al-Sager, head of the Gulf Research Centre close to government circles, indicating that for Tehran, the escalatory phase was over, and adding that Washington did not want an escalation from Israel. There have been many recent reminders of Gulf states' vulnerability. Iran on Saturday seized a cargo ship in the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow stretch of water through which most Gulf energy exports pass, and has threatened to close shipping lanes there entirely. Meanwhile Yemen's Iran-backed Houthi group, against which Saudi Arabia was fighting for years until moving towards a peace deal in December, has repeatedly attacked shipping and deployed drones towards Israel skirting Saudi airspace in recent months. The Houthis had several times attacked key Saudi Arabian energy facilities in recent years before the peace talks gained momentum last year and retain the capacity to do so again. In 2019 they hit key facilities in Saudi Arabia that process the vast majority of the country's crude output and in 2022 they attacked three oil tanker trucks in the UAE. "A conflagration will see the price of oil shooting up. The traffic of oil will be affected," the source said, describing likely outcomes of a wider regional war. De facto Saudi ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has for years tried to focus on his ambitious vision to develop mega projects in the kingdom free from geopolitical distractions. Saudi economic ambitions were at the heart of Riyadh's push for detente with Iran, but the kingdom was also very concerned about security, said Saudi analyst Aziz Algashian. "It's not just about the projects in our prosperous region ... It doesn't want to be caught in the crossfire between Israel, Iran and the United States," he said. The war in Gaza had already put policies of entente under strain. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain made peace with Israel in 2020 through the so-called 'Abraham accords' and Saudi Arabia was considering following suit in return for US security commitments. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Iran last year put aside decades of destructive feuding that had fueled conflicts around the region with a deal to restore diplomatic ties and avoid harming each other's interests. But the devastation in Gaza has derailed further moves towards peace with Israel, and Iran's backing of regional Shi'ite Muslim allies that have targeted US bases in Iraq and elsewhere has raised concerns in the Gulf. The fact that detente might allow Gulf states to bring down regional tensions was probably regarded in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as confirmation their policy was working, Algashian said. "If there wasn't Saudi-Iranian normalization and rapprochement, Saudi Arabia would be far more anxious right now," he said. ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-14

The shooting down of from Iran in the early hours of April 14 shows that an important element of the October 7 grand strategy against Israel failed: the regional alliance against the Islamic Republic did not crumble. It is unclear how much, if any, foreknowledge Iran had of Hamas’ plans for its horrific Simchat Torah attack, but one thing is certain: the ayatollahs saw it as a golden opportunity to break up the growing alliance between Israel and moderate Sunni countries in the region. That alliance was forged not out of any sudden epiphany among the Sunni states that Israel had a legitimate right to exist in the region, but rather out of a common fear of Iran and an understanding that only by working together with Israel can this moderate camp beat back Iran’s hegemonic Mideast designs. It was not the love of Tel Aviv that the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and -- unofficially -- Saudi Arabia together with Israel, but rather a fear and hatred of Tehran. The presence of Israel in the region might be an annoyance for those countries, but the ideology of the leaders in Iran was an existential threat. Out of that threat, cooperation -- including close security cooperation -- was born.Royal Jordanian Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft fighter pilots fly alongside a US Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft while waiting to connect for fuel over Jordan. October 19, 2009. (credit: Caycee Cook/US Air Force) First through in 2020, a ball that began rolling after the moderate Gulf countries saw the seriousness with which Israel took the Iranian nuclear threat -- even willing, under the Obama Administration -- to go toe-to-toe with the US president over the issue. Then, after the Abraham Accords, the next country that seemed on the verge of normalizing its already existing ties with Israel was Saudi Arabia, something that -- last summer -- was gaining significant momentum.. Then October 7 hit.  Hamas believed that with that strike, they placed the Palestinian issue squarely back on the international agenda, and the Iranians believed that this attack -- and what they knew would be a fierce Israeli response -- would scuttle any formal Saudi-Israel pact and would deliver a death blow to the Abraham Accords.  How, they thought, could this alliance continue to exist and even grow with the inevitable anger in the Arab and Muslim world over Israel’s war in Gaza and its toll on Palestinian lives? As the war ground on, as the pictures coming from Gaza -- broadcast 24/7 in the most grisly way possible by Hamas’ Qatar-sponsored -- the ayatollahs were rubbing their hands in glee thinking that now any Israeli-Saudi normalization, as well as any new regional defense architecture in formation to fend off their designs,  were dead in the water. The response early Sunday morning to Iran’s massive assault showed, however, that this was not the case. The defensive capabilities built up quietly over the last number of years precisely worked for this eventuality. Israel, together with regional allies whose names are not being revealed publicly but whom everyone can imagine, assisted Israel in knocking Iran’s drones and missiles out of the skies. Iran had hoped October 7 would destroy the regional alliance against it being formed with Israel,, but the dramatic events in the Middle Eastern skies on April 14 proved that those hopes were in vain. Not only that, but Iran’s decision to attack from its territory has now shifted the conversation from the Palestinians to their own capabilities, with the world now wondering what would have happened if Iran had nuclear capabilities. The surreal Iranian attack Saturday night -- there is no other way to describe a night where an entire country is holding its breath wondering where exactly the projectiles will land, which it knows is heading in its direction -- gave proof that the war in Gaza did not scuttle the new regional alliance. Jordanian, Saudi, and Emirati fear of Iran is greater than their anger at Israel for the war in Gaza (especially since the rulers in those countries secretly hope that Israel finishes off Hamas). The Iranian attack did something else as well. At a time when Israel was feeling isolated in the world when tensions with Washington were at a fever pitch when US President Joe Biden publicly blasted Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli policies -- giving a green light to Israel’s other allies like Britain and France to do the same -- the role these countries, especially the US, played in intercepting those drones and missiles showed that Israel is not alone. A few weeks back, the Economist magazine ran a much-discussed dreary photo on its front page of an Israeli flag flying in what appears to be a dusty wind under the ominous two-word headline: “Israel alone.” The response late Saturday night and early Sunday morning from Israel’s allies -- both regional and further afield -- shows that the headline was, thankfully,  way off the mark. ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-14

The decision by Iran to use drones to target Israel on April 13, lifts a curtain on a new era of . Drones have been used for years by many countries. For instance, Israel was one of the first countries in the world to pioneer the use of drones in warfare back in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The US used the Predator drone, first for surveillance in the 1990s and then for targeted strikes in the early 2000s. China became a , primarily in the commercial field with sales of DJI drones. Now the Iranian drone era is here. It is an era of Iran’s drone wars and Israel is now an increasing target.  The Iranian drone war has come to Israel is a surreal war. Reports over the last week and a half suggested Iran would want to strike at Israel to “punish” Israel for an airstrike that Iran blamed on Israel. The airstrike in question took place in Damascus on April 1 and killed an . Iran has blamed Israel. Since that time there have been increasing reports that Iran would want to strike at Israel. Iran sent its foreign minister around the region, including to Damascus to drum up support. Iran’s top diplomat also called most of the Gulf countries and also spoke with his Iraqi counterpart. This is how Iran’s plan unfolded. Over the last several days reports indicated that Iran might resort to using drones. Iran also has ballistic missiles. It has used those missiles to attack US forces in Iraq in 2020 in response to the killing of IRGC Quds Force head Qasem Soleimani. Iran also used drones and cruise missiles to attack Saudi Arabia in 2019. Smoke rises after what the Iranian media said was an Israeli strike on a buidling close to the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria April 1, 2024. (credit: REUTERS/FIRAS MAKDESI) Iran recently used ballistic missiles in January to target Syria and Pakistan, claiming to target terrorists. It appears Iran was testing the precision of the missiles. Iran has increased the precision of various types of its solid and liquid filled missiles. These include the Fatah family of missiles, such as the Fatah 110s it used to target Kurdish dissidents in Koya in northern Iraq in 2018. Iran also has cruise missiles. It has used cruise missiles against Saudi Arabia in 2019. In addition the Iran-backed Houthis have used cruise missiles to target Israel over the last six months. However, it is not clear how large the arsenal of Iranian cruise missiles is. Iran has chosen drones for its opening salvo to threaten Israel because drones have many qualities that appeal to the Iranian regime. The Iranian drones are not very large, only several meters long and two meters in width with a warhead of around 40kg. They are cheap and expendable. They can fly a route using waypoints and they can fly relatively low. They also have a long range. They are relatively slow, but slow is not always a bad thing for the Iranians. It is true that their slow pace means they can be detected, but they can also change direction, unlike a missile that flies on a trajectory. Drones are also relatively accurate. Drones can also be launched from a variety of platforms. For instance drones can be launched from ships, or from trucks, they can also be launched from containers, of the sort used in maritime transport, or they can be towed and launched from a kind of catapult. This gives Iran many options to use the drones that it has developed over the years. The Iranian attempt to use drones to target Israel is not new. It has used drones in the past and it has exported large numbers of drones to Russia. Russia has been using Iranian Shahed 136 drones to terrorize Ukraine over the last two years of war. Russia also prefers to use drones because they are cheap and expendable and strike terror into civilian areas. Ukraine has had success downing the Iranian drones that Russia uses. This is a positive thing when it comes to analyzing the overall threat that drones can pose. However, Iranian drones struck the Saudi Arabian Abqaiq facility in 2019, harming energy exports from Saudi Arabia. Russia’s experience with Iranian drones has definitely provided feedback to the Iranians in terms of improving the drones, perhaps improving their precision, maneuver and range. Using the drones is also a selling point for Iran. Iran wants to make its Shahed 136 and other types of drones a best seller and do for drone warfare what the Soviets did for the AK-47. In essence, Iranian drones are its version of the AK-47, because this has become a uniquely Iranian type of weapon when used as a kamikaze weapon system. We are now living in the Iranian drone war era. It is an era that has been coming like a slow train for many years. Iran increased its drone power while many countries watched and did not view this as a major threat. This is because Iran’s nuclear program, its militias and its missiles were seen as a greater threat. However, the Iranian decision to export drone technology around the region and to use drones increasingly, it what has made this weapon particularly concerning. Many countries woke up to the threat when Iran exported drones to Russia. For Israelis sitting home on the evening of April 13 it has been a surreal feeling, knowing that drones are on the way but that they can take many hours to arrive. This is a unique form of warfare, one where a large amount of warning can happen ahead of time. However, that may give the appearance that it is less of a threat. That is not the case. Large swarms of drones are a major threat and Iran is pioneering this threat.  ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-13

An April 1, Israel Defense Forces airstrikes on three vehicles in a humanitarian convoy of the in Gaza led to the deaths of seven humanitarian aid workers. In the wake of the tragedy, Erin Gore, the CEO of WCK said “these are the heroes of WCK. These 7 beautiful souls were killed by the IDF in a strike as they were returning from a full day's mission. Their smiles, laughter, and voices are forever embedded in our memories.” Three of those killed in the airstrike were members of the and the three were military veterans. This sheds light on the important work that security coordinators have in working with NGOs and also other organization. According to reports in UK media, the three members of the security team included fifty-seven year old John Chapman, thirty-three year old James Henderson and forty-seven year old James Kirby. All of them were from the UK. In a statement by James Kirby’s family , they said “James understood the dangers of venturing into Gaza, drawing from his experiences in the British Armed Forces, where he bravely served tours in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Despite the risks, his compassionate nature drove him to offer assistance.” He had served in Afghanistan in 2011. Kirby was born in Bristol and had served in the army. Chapman was born in Aylesbury and was a former special forces soldier in the Special Boat Service. Later he worked in private security work in the Gulf, according to a remembrance at the Daily Mail. Henderson was from Cornwall and had served in the Royal Marines for six years before moving to security work in 2016. Kirby’s LinkedIn profile said he was an SIA-licensed close protection officer with experience in “executive protection, hostile and covert surveillance, security management and maritime security.”A Palestinian inspects near a vehicle where employees from the World Central Kitchen (WCK), including foreigners, were killed in an Israeli airstrike (credit: Ahmed Zakot/Reuters)  The three men all worked for a security company called Solace Global, according to a Channel 4 report in the UK. Solace Global’s non-executive director Matthew Harding, told the channel “the impact on operations is that we will clearly and have clearly, taken a very close look at all of our planning, risk control measures and our activities up to, during and after the event. I think the majority of people working in this industry are either ex-military or ex-law enforcement and have a life time of experience of operating in this kind of environment before they embark on this type of career.” The BBC noted “the men had been in Gaza for just over a week because the firm regularly rotates its staff. They were due to return home in days, the BBC understands. The men's roles as security advisers were to ensure the convoy followed its safety procedures and remained on the correct route.” World Central Kitchen (WCK) founder José Andrés, said “the airstrikes on our convoy, I don’t think were an unfortunate mistake. It was really a direct attack on clearly marked vehicles whose movements were known by everybody at the IDF." A BBC article on the airstrike noted that there wasn’t a problem with the information relayed to the IDF about the convoy’s movements on the night in question. Gaza is a complex place and driving between areas held by the IDF and areas held by Hamas is fraught with dangers. Today the IDF controls a corridor across Gaza which essentially cuts off Gaza city from Central Gaza, enabling the IDF to move more easily across Gaza and neutralize threats. This corridor, called Netzarim, begins in Israel and ends at the sea where there is a new pier the IDF has built. It was on that pier that. WCK barge with food was docked so that hundreds of tons of aid could be offloaded. It was the second time the WCK had done this. Around 100 tonnes had been offloaded of the 240 tonnes on the ship. I reached out to two security professionals who are familiar with the kind of work the security team were doing with WCK. An ex-British military security advisor described how when he did similar work the professionals would have liasoned with COGAT. They would provided the grid references they were travelling through. The security team with WCK had three men and likely that meant one in each of the vehicles. The convoy that left the pier where the IDF was included a number of trucks and three cars. The cars had the WCK workers in them. Somewhere along the route an armed suspect boarded one of the trucks.  The security team would have done a threat assessment about the route they were travelling on. The men had backgrounds in the military, but Gaza is not the same as Afghanistan and the complex environment and the ever-changing conflict in Gaza poses unique challenges. It would have been important for the men to have a liason with the IDF and also be able to speak directly with the brigade in whose sector they were operating. This could be the Nahal brigade in central Gaza, or the southern brigade of the Gaza division. The security advisor I spoke to said that when he went into Gaza he would have the phone of the operations room of the IDF brigade responsible for the area. “I used to always check and phone my number. It’s down to individual professionalism.” The cars proceeded south from the area of the IDF-controlled corridor near the pier, travelling along the coastal Rashid road. They then turned left into Deir al-Balah where they went to two hangars run by WCK, where the trucks were supposed to remain with the aid. The armed man that had boarded the truck stayed in Dier al-Balah. Three cars with the seven WCK members then left and went back toward the coast at 11:06pm. They reached the coastal road and turned left and at 11:09 a drone carried out an airstrike on one of the vehicles. The WCK members then moved from into the two remaining vehicles. “The guys did the right drill,” says the source. The team likely all had some level of first aid training. “I would have provided first aid in the vehicle…if you didn’t know it [the attack] came from the sky…they might think there could be follow up with guns,” the expert says. I spoke to a second source who was a security coordination officer who ran convoys in Lebanon in the 1990s and also during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and has continued his work in several African countries. He has decades of experience and discussed what it means to “advise humanitarians in how to mitigate the risks in their delivering crucial aid during highly kinetic activities in the MidEast and Africa.” He notes that security team members are brought along to “provide a professional security assessment to humanitarians for risk mitigation for a specific mission that is going on.” He says that in Lebanon or areas in Africa he worked, when these types of incidents happened it could have been chalked up to intimidation to those operating in the area, especially when ‘near misses’ are reported. In his experience, this often occurs when there is insufficient information sharing between the Liaison Branch of the IDF and unit commanders on the ground. A professional security coordination officer has to make sure that the planned route has received clearances from the key players on the ground, in this case the IDF and Hamas. It’s important this discussion also involved the commanders in the area, on the ground. He says the killing of the seven humanitarians demonstrates an “appalling lack of information sharing between the IDF Liaison Branch, the WCK security coordination officers, and the operational commanders on the ground, or it suggests that the commanders on the ground didn’t care.  Either way it’s an appalling breakdown of the chain of command.” The security team members would have likely had to talk with Hamas or the Hamas “police” that are in the area. This presents a very complex area to work in. “From my experience when you go through an area where there are two sets of combatants, you need to have guarantees from both sides that the forces will stand down. If they don’t have that I can’t imagine why they would have advised [the humanitarians to run the convoy].” I asked if travelling at night made it more dangerous. “Yes and no. There is no right answer. You travel at the time you think that is right based on the agreement of both parties to the conflict. We can ask whether it’s safer at day or night…a drone can track you anytime.” When modern militaries like Israel use drones, the issue of travelling at night is no longer a factor. “The fog of war is an apt term for what can happen. But I can’t imagine these guys starting out without a satnav or cell phone [that worked in the area] and having contacted both parties that they were now moving along the pre-agreed route.” In the end, when the strikes began the men had no time to save themselves. The first car was hit at 11:09 and two minutes later, a few hundred meters down the road, the second car was struck. At this point, the survivors made it into the last remaining vehicle. Two minutes later at 11:13 a third strike hit that vehicle. As the cars were struck and they tried to make it further south there wasn’t much they could do. “You’re a civilian and unarmed and your only weapon is your military experience and your aim is to mitigate the risk to the humanitarians,” says the expert. “They would be risk adverse and know the complexities of war and know what can happen.” ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-11

On April 1, 2024, a suspected Israeli airstrike destroyed the Iranian consulate in Damascus, marking a significant escalation in regional tensions. The attack, resulting in the deaths of eight Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) senior commanders, including Brig.-Gen. Mohammed Reza Zahedi – in charge of the Quds Force operations in Syria and Lebanon – presented Tehran with an unprecedented dilemma, reminiscent of former ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s “chalice of poison” decision during the 1985 Iran-Iraq war.  To deter future Israeli attacks, Iran would need to retaliate directly against Israel. However, such action could provoke a severe response from the IDF at a time when the Iranian regime has already lost much of its legitimacy.  Iran’s UN mission accused Israel of “a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, international law, and the foundational principles of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises.” Tehran urged the to condemn the attack, quoting the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, which provides immunity to embassies and consulates.  However, these lamentations sounded hollow, given the regime’s decades-long history of using diplomatic facilities to promote its violent goals.  Hossein Dhaghan, an IRGC commander in Lebanon in the early 1980s, helped Imad Mughniyeh, the chief of the military wing of Hezbollah, to blow up the American Embassy in Beirut in 1983 and the Embassy Annex in 1984, in addition to attacking the US Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut. Hundreds of Americans perished in these atrocities. An Iranian-backed group had also tried to destroy the US embassy in Kuwait in 1983, all part of a coordinated plan to get the American forces out of the Middle East. Military units of the IRGC Ground Force are seen as they launched war games in the Gulf, December 22, 2018. (credit: HAMED MALEKPOUR/WANA VIA REUTERS) Targeting Israel and Jewish facilities was also high on the IRGC agenda. In 1992, a suicide bomber destroyed the and, in 1994, the AMIA, the Jewish communal center.  Argentinian authorities found that the Iranian embassy was “used as a primary operations center” for the AMIA bombing and Hadi Soleimanpour, the ambassador, was served with an arrest warrant. TURNING IRANIAN embassies into virtual operation centers of the IRGC-QF was common practice. The Iranian embassy in Damascus was a case in point. Ali Akbhar Mohtashami Pour, the ambassador, doubled as the IRGC front man in creating the Hezbollah terror group. Under his supervision, Iranian arms and ammunition were flown into Damascus airport, where Mohtashami Pour had them smuggled into Lebanon.  In another notorious case, the QF flaunted its presence in the Iranian embassy in Baghdad. Qassem Suleimani, the chief of QF, picked the ambassadors from the ranks of his commanders. Iraj Masjedi controlled the pro-Iranian Shia militias who fought the American forces in the early 2000s. His successors, Hassan Kazemi Qomi and Hassan Danaeifar were likewise senior QF commanders who continued the oversight of the Shia militias.  Less publicized but equally insidious was the regime’s use of its embassy in Yemen. Hasan Irloo, a QF member close to Suleimani, played a major role in providing advanced weapons and training to the Houthis. He bore the title of chief of staff in the embassy in Sanaa, but in reality, he was part of IRGC-QF network supporting operations throughout the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen. Suleimani referred to QF’s oversight of the embassies when he wrote to Gen. David Petraeus that “I control Iran’s policy for Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan.”  Zahedi, a close friend of Suleimani, was a key player in this network. As chief of Sepah e-Lobnan (the Lebanon Corps) between 1998-2002, he collaborated with the new Iranian ambassador in Damascus, Hossein Sheikholeslam, in upgrading Hezbollah’s capabilities, including an elaborate tunnel system. Zahedi, also known as Hassan Mahdavi or Reza Mahdavi, was part of a small Quds Force-Hezbollah cadre that included Suleimani, Brig.-Gen. Ahmed Kazemi, and Imad Mughniyeh, the chief of Hezbollah’s military operations.  The triumvirate was credited with forcing Israel to leave Lebanon in 2000 and with the IDF’s difficulties during the Second Lebanon War, in 2006. After Mughniyeh died in a joint CIA-Mossad operation in 2008, Zahedi returned to head the Lebanon Corps, which in due course was merged with Syrian command, becoming Sepahe Lobnan va Sorieh (the Syria- Lebanon Corps).  The new assignment put Zahedi in the center of QF outreach to its proxies, a role that grew in importance after the killing of Suleimani in January 2020. Zahedi acquired more responsibility when Jawad Ghafari, the head of QF Unit 4000 – in charge of transmitting weapons to Hezbollah through Syria – was forced to resign under controversial circumstances in 2021. Zahedi utilized drones, secret airline flights, and the land bridge to transport a significant amount of weapons to Hezbollah. The arms were delivered either directly to Beirut International Airport or through Damascus, employing civilian airlines like the IRGC-affiliated Meraj Airlines and Mahan Air, which is also connected to the IRGC. Zahedi also oversaw the Iranian militias operating in the , known as the Golan File. Reflecting Zahedi’s unique prestige, he was the only non-Lebanese member of Hezbollah’s Shura Council.  Most crucially, Ismael Ghani, Suleimani’s successor, deputized Zahedi to lead the so-called “Unity of Fronts” operation, a plan to mobilize the Israeli Arabs and the West Bank Palestinians under the command of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The plan was deemed a success when widespread riots in Israel led to Operation Guardians on the Wall in May 2021. To augment Hezbollah’s traditional smuggling from Lebanon, Zahedi ordered a pro-Iranian militia in the Daara Governate in Syria to open a new smuggling route to the West Bank through Jordan.  On March 25 this year, the IDF seized a significant number of advanced arms that Unit 4000 had smuggled into the West Bank with the help of a Fatah official based in Lebanon and affiliated with Hezbollah. With the outbreak of the Gaza War, Zahedi became a coordinator for Hamas and PIJ, Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces, and the Houthis. The consulate building in Damascus turned into a full-fledged operations center and a meeting place of representatives of the proxies, including Ziad al Nakhalah, the secretary-general of the PIJ, a frequent visitor.  Both Zahedi and his deputy were given consular ranks to ensure them diplomatic protection. Having exploited the Vienna Convention with impunity for decades, the regime felt satisfied that Israel would not risk attacking a consular facility. Devastating as the loss of Zahedi was to the QF, the hit on the consulate presented Tehran with an unprecedented dilemma. To deter future attacks on its diplomatic outposts, Iran would need to directly retaliate against Israel.  A show of force would be all the more important because the regime lost credibility by giving mostly rhetorical support to Hamas, a key member of its “Axis of Resistance.” However, direct action would invite a costly IDF retaliation at a time when the autocratic regime has lost most of its legitimacy. Iran is facing a second “chalice of poison” moment.  In 1985, was forced to end the war with Iraq to avoid a collapse of the regime. He described the decision as “drinking a chalice of poison.” It looks like his successors may have to drink from that same chalice to avoid total ruination.  The writer is a senior fellow at the Philos Project.  ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-07

’s threat to reassess US policy on the Gaza war if Israel does not alter course may or may not impact Arab voters in the swing state of Michigan, endangering Biden’s reelection bid by threatening to stay home on Election Day. It will, however, register loud and clear in the Arab states in the Gulf that are watching carefully to see not only if Israel can eviscerate an enemy but also whether the US will stand by a long-time, trusted, and close ally. It is unclear that there is anything Biden may do short of cutting off arms supplies to Israel and joining South Africa in accusing the Jewish state of genocide that will get anti-Israel Arab voters and progressives to vote for him in November. It is clear, however, that if Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states perceive that the president is “throwing Israel under the bus,” then they will adjust their strategic calculations accordingly. Following the tough conversation last Thursday between and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the president put out a statement warning that a reassessment of policy regarding the Gaza war might be imminent.  The Prime Minister’s Office, which almost always puts out a readout of a call with US presidents, opted to remain silent this time.Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Joe Biden (credit: REUTERS/KEVIN LAMARQUE AND ALEX KOLOMOISKY/POOL) Biden’s stern message was heard loud and clear in Jerusalem. Shortly after that conversation, the security cabinet met and agreed to increase the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza via the Ashdod Port and the Erez crossing. The Gulf states also got the message, and for those countries’ rulers, who are keen on cooperation with Israel – as opposed to their publics, who are infuriated by Israel’s actions – the message has to be somewhat troubling: the US is tying the hands of one of its closest allies in a fight against an enemy aligned with Iran, the most malevolent forces in the region. The Arab voters and the progressives to whom Biden’s change of tone seems to be pandering might want a ceasefire, something that will enable Hamas to survive to fight another day. However, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain are uninterested in that outcome. Hamas is aligned with Iran, and Iran is – and remains – their mortal enemy. Seen through a very narrow lens – the media lens bringing this war to the West – this is a battle between Israel and Hamas in which too many innocent Palestinians and humanitarian workers are being killed. But if you widen the lens, this is a battle not only between Israel and Hamas but also between the moderate camp in the Middle East and the radical one supported by Iran. If Hamas survives because the US has tied Israel’s hands, then the radical camp is emboldened. That is a disaster for Israel but also a disaster for others in the moderate camp – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and even Jordan’s King Abdullah – whom Iran and its proxies also threaten. Israel, as the saying goes, has been to this movie before, when a confrontation with the US administration placed it and the moderate Arab camp on the same side. That “movie” played in 2015, at the height of the tension between Washington and Jerusalem over the Iranian nuclear deal. In March of that year, Netanyahu delivered a speech in Congress that was viewed by many as blatant interference in US domestic politics and soured relations between the prime minister and leading Democratic politicians for years. BUT RON DERMER, today the strategic affairs minister who at the time was ambassador to Washington and the architect of that speech, said in an interview with Mishpacha magazine in December 2020 that Netanyahu’s speech to Congress was critical in forging relations with the moderate Arab countries that culminated in the signing of the Abraham Accords five years later. “Without that speech, I doubt we’d have peace deals with the Arab states today,” he said. Dermer said this speech significantly raised Israel’s stature in the eyes of the Arab states since they realized that if s premier was willing “to stand up for what he believes in,” even if it meant a frontal confrontation with the United States president, then Israel was no American “vassal state,” but rather an “independent force” that could be relied upon. “I can tell you as a fact that the speech dramatically accelerated contacts beneath the surface between Israel and many Arab states,” Dermer said, adding that when the Arab countries saw Israel leading the charge against the Iranian nuclear deal – even against then-president Barack Obama’s wishes – they concluded that it was a country with whom it was worth forging a strong partnership. Those same states are carefully watching both Israel and the US today. They are watching the Jewish state to see whether it has the wherewithal and staying power to defeat Hamas because if Israel can’t decisively defeat Hamas, what good would an alliance with it be that aims to prevent an Iranian takeover of the region? And they are watching America to see whether the administration – because of a concern about domestic US politics and the progressive wing of the Democratic Party – will ditch an ally in its time of need. Following Biden’s conversation with Netanyahu, Republican Speaker of the House Mike Johnson posted on X that the president’s ultimatums should be going to Hamas, not Israel. “Biden should not undercut our ally amidst an existential threat by conditioning our support,” he wrote.America’s other allies in the region are undoubtedly watching to see whether the administration is doing just that. In other words, what is good for the Arab voters in Michigan may not be suitable for the Arab governments in countries like the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-04-04

Following an in-person meeting with a European leader, former U.S. President Donald Trump spoke recently with a Gulf state leader, according to The New York Times. The involvement in foreign affairs by Trump came as the 2024 Elections began to heat up in a rematch with incumbent President Joe Biden, currently involved with significant negotiations in the Gulf region. According to the NYT report, citing two sources, Trump spoke with Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). The conversation was described as "their first publicly disclosed conversation" since the former U.S. president left office in January 2021. The report, however, was scant on details of the conversation, only saying that the two sources were "briefed on the discussion" but were not authorized to speak publicly about it. Representatives from either party, Trump or MBS, had not been able to comment. Meanwhile, the Biden administration were pushing for what's been touted as an important deal in trilateral negotiations between the Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States, which Secretary of State recently estimated as "getting closer." This latest conversation with a world leader, followed a visit by Hungarian Prime Minister to Trump's Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida, who later touted the presumptive Republican nominee as a leader who was "respected and can bring peace." ...قراءة المزيد

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