Suez

2024-04-08

Those who fought and survived the hoped that the bitter lessons of that war had been learned and that Israel would never experience a similar catastrophe.  Tragically, one day after the 50th anniversary of that war, history repeated itself with the devastating Hamas attack of October 7. The similarities between these events are chillingly striking. The Yom Kippur War began with an attack by Egypt and Syria on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar. There were many signs that war was imminent. Both countries visibly massed hundreds of thousands of soldiers on their borders with Israel.  Substantive warnings came from Israeli intelligence services, as well as from Jordan’s King Hussain and the spy Ashraf Marwan, the son-in-law of the late Egyptian President, .  Notably, a week before Yom Kippur, Russian military advisors in Syria and Egypt sent their families back home.  Israel’s front lines were poorly defended; there were only five hundred reserve soldiers stationed on the Suez Canal facing Egypt and only three thousand on the Golan Heights facing Syria.   An IDF armored unit in its encampment on the east bank of the Suez Canal during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. (credit: YIGAL TOMARKIN/GPO) After the victories of the 1967 Six-Day War, when the Arabs had been quickly and soundly defeated, both the Israeli military and the general population were still collectively steeped in hubris.  They ignored the costly War of Attrition of the early 1970’s. They seemed to ignore the rearming of Arab armies, which had acquired new anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, thereby erasing both the air and armored corps superiority of Israel.  By 1973, the military defense of Sinai was based on a line of fortifications called the “Bar Lev Line” and a plan to ignite gasoline over the Suez Canal should the Egyptian army try to cross it.  The Israeli army had also installed a sophisticated system intended to provide early warning of an incipient attack. None of these worked as the Egyptian military attacked on Yom Kippur.  The Bar Lev Line was overrun within hours; both the plan to set fire to the canal and the early warning system were complete failures. The Israeli government was held captive by the premise created by the Chief of Military Intelligence that the Arabs, lacking sufficient military aircraft, were incapable of mounting an attack against Israel. Similarly, on October 7, 2023, Hamas lured Israel into believing that they were not planning to attack. Rather, as the entity holding power in the government, they projected the illusion that their resources were focused on the economic rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip.  The plan to invade Israel was kept secret by Hamas leadership and was not even revealed to their own invading forces until the morning of the attack.   The attack on took place on the Jewish holidays of Shabbat and Simchas Torah, which occurred on the same day when relatively few soldiers were stationed on the border with Gaza.  The reduced number of soldiers reflected the belief of the commanders of the Israeli Defense Force that Hamas was incapable of mounting an effective attack and that any potential invasion would be prevented by both a fortified security wall and a system of automated weapons.  The Israeli Defense Forces had erected observation towers and relied on surveillance balloons to monitor activities in Gaza.  Meanwhile, they diverted troops from the border to deal with the growing unrest in the West Bank.  As has been extensively documented, Hamas bulldozed and bypassed the supposedly impenetrable Israeli wall by flying over it and attacking the Mediterranean Sea.  They destroyed the observation towers and the military communication systems, thus overwhelming poorly defended Israeli settlements and military installations with thousands of attackers. The renowned Israeli Defense Forces were powerless to stop the catastrophic onslaught.  In hindsight, there were multiple warnings that Hamas had been planning an attack on Israel for months, if not longer. First, its attack plan, known as “Jericho Walls,” was known to Israeli intelligence. Second, both the Egyptian and the US intelligence agencies had warned Israel about the risk of an imminent assault from Gaza.   Third, Hamas fighters had been viewed as practicing the takeover of Israeli military and civilian locations using models of Israeli communities.  Finally, analysts and spotters trained to analyze border irregularities warned that Hamas had begun preparations for an attack.   Just as in 1973, neither the military high command nor the political establishment took these warnings seriously, belittling the capabilities of Hamas and dismissing the warnings from other intelligence sources, as well as their own border spotters. And, as in the Yom Kippur War, those on the frontlines were sacrificed, and those who rushed in to assist them were outnumbered and outgunned. While only Israeli soldiers took the brunt of the attacks during the Yom Kippur War, on October 7, the full range of the Israeli population was victimized, including children and the elderly. The October 7 massacre shook Israel to its core; its long-term effects are yet to be realized. It is critical that, for Israel to survive and fulfill its promise as a democratic and safe haven for all its citizens, it must engage in a thorough and painful investigation to unearth the roots of this massive failure in strategic intelligence and national arrogance to learn, understand, and incorporate the bitter lessons of October 7.  History must not be allowed to repeat itself again.   Itzhak Brook (MD) is a professor of Pediatrics at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, and the Author of “In the Sands Of Sinai—A Physician’s Account of The Yom Kippur War.” ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-03-21

The Battle of Karameh took place on March 21, 1968, in Jordan, pitting Israeli forces against a combined force of Palestinian fighters and Jordanian soldiers. Because the name for the site of the battle also means “dignity,” the battle has taken on multiple meanings for the Palestinians and Jordanians and is considered a victory for them. The battle is not often remembered in Israel. It is being spotlighted this year in Jordan and some Arabic-language media because of the . The battle took place in the era after the 1967 Six Day War, which resulted in a rapid Israeli defeat of Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, and the decisive battle in which Israel conquered the West Bank. In the Battle of Karameh, Palestinian groups, primarily Fatah, launched attacks on Israel. They had bases in Jordan among Palestinians living there. Israel was now facing the prospect of a conflict not only along the Jordan Valley but also along the Suez and could deteriorate into wars of attrition on two fronts. prepared for a rapid assault to defeat Fatah in Jordan and dismantle the terrorist infrastructure that was on the Jordanian side of the Jordan River. The raid was supposed to include paratroops and commandos, and it came following an Israeli bus was bombed on March 18 while driving in the Arava. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and the cabinet approved the attack; Moshe Dayan believed it would defeat an emerging "wave of terror" in the Jordan Valley. What was meant to target and overpower Palestinian groups with a mass of IDF troops ended up with the Jordanian army entering the fray. The battle became a slugfest stretching over dozens of kilometers of the Jordan Valley, concentrated around the town of Karameh. After fifteen hours, the IDF withdrew. The Jordanians and Palestinians see it as a victory. Al-Ain media in the UAE explained the battle's importance in the region. In an article published on Thursday, it said the battle showcased that Arab unity could defeat Israel and that the myth of in the wake of the 1967 war, was broken that day. “On this day, Jordanians, as well as Palestinians, celebrate the anniversary of the Battle of Karameh, which is the first Arab and Palestinian victory over the Israeli war machine after the defeat in 1967,” Al-Ain media said. In Jordan, state media also noted that “the Royal Hashemite Documentation Center unveiled on Thursday a historical artifact commemorating the enduring legacy of the Battle of Karameh. This artifact, dated March 24, 1968, features a collection of articles from the Jordanian newspaper Al-Dustour, chronicling the events surrounding the Battle of Karameh, which unfolded on March 21, 1968.” The report notes that “according to a statement, the document prominently displays excerpts from a press conference hosted by the late King Hussein bin Talal. This conference aimed to elucidate the realities of the battle, showcasing the valor displayed by the Jordan Arab Army in repelling the ruthless Israeli aggression.” The commemoration describes the bravery of the Arab soldiers in the Jordanian army. The historic report also notes “the geopolitical significance of the battle, emphasizing the pivotal victory secured by the Jordanian army against Israeli aggression. The newspaper also documented international support for Jordan's right to defend its territory. The Documentation Center emphasized the significance of this artifact, as it serves as a testament to a proud chapter in the history of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.” Members of the Jordanian Gendarmerie stand guard during a demonstration to express solidarity with the Palestinian people and to celebrate following Israel-Hamas truce, in Karameh, Jordan valley, Jordan May 21, 2021. (credit: JEHAD SHELBAK/REUTERS) This is important because the commemoration and reports clearly tie this to the current state of affairs. Israel was also portrayed in the region as having a powerful army before October 7. However, there are now questions in the region about Israel’s capabilities. Iran has knitted together multiple arenas against Israel. Israel has evacuated residents from the north as Hezbollah attacks with impunity. Some wonder whether Israel can defeat or deter Hezbollah or even fight a multi-front war like in 1967. While Israel defeated three armies in three countries in 1967, today, Israel is still fighting Hamas in Gaza after five months. Hamas has been able to reconstitute itself in northern Gaza, and Hamas continues to control Rafah. In addition, Israel continues to have to rely on Qatar, a US ally that hosts Hamas, for hostage talks. Israel has not been able to free most hostages via military means, even though the hostages are held in a small area of Gaza, close to where Israeli forces are operating. Clearly, the commemorations of the 1968 battle are being highlighted today to bring up questions about Israel’s capabilities and also portray the Palestinians as being capable, with Arab support, of defeating Israel. This has ramifications for regional policies and shifts in the emerging multi-polar world.  ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-03-21

أكدت القوات البحرية التابعة للاتحاد الأوروبي في البحر الأحمر عبر حسابها على منصة «إكس» أن «مروحية الفرقاطة الفرنسة اعترضت طائرة بدون طيار قادمة من اليمن تهدد حركة الملاحة البحرية المدنية في البحر الأحمر». وأعلنت القوات البحرية الأوروبية، أنها اعترضت طائرة مسيرة قادمة من اليمن كانت تستهدف الملاحة البحرية المدنية في البحر. وأضافت أن الأولوية هي «ضمان حرية الملاحة والأمن البحري من السويس إلى هرمز». وتشن جماعة الحوثيين من وقت لآخر هجمات على السفن التجارية، عرقلت حركة العبور في مياه مضيق باب المندب ومياه خليج عدن. واطلق الاتحاد الأوروبي عمليات مهمة بحرية أوروبية باسم «أسبيدس» لحماية السفن التجارية في البحر الأحمر من هجمات جماعة «الحوثي» اليمنية. وشنت الولايات المتحدة والبريطانيا، غارت جوية على مواقع للحوثي في المين، انتقاما من الهجمات الحوثية التي تستهدف الملاحة في البحر الأحمر. EUNAVFOR ASPIDES 🇪🇺 | Interception par l'hélicoptère de la frégate 🇫🇷 d'un drone aérien en provenance du Yémen menaçant le trafic maritime civil en mer Rouge.➡️ La priorité: assurer la liberté de navigation et la sûreté maritime de Suez à Ormuz — Armée française - Opérations militaires (@EtatMajorFR) ...قراءة المزيد

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2024-02-11

At the beginning of the program on 103FM, Arel Segal and the guest presenter, retired , discussed the progress of the fighting in the Gaza Strip and the weakening of Hamas. "There are reports that the head of the Mossad is formulating the Israeli response to the mediators' proposals, although it is unclear if there is a coherent strategy in light of Hamas's response," said Segal. "How can we advance here before we're in a military event? The issue of the hostages is a strategic event." He added further, "We see that the IDF's ability to tail Hamas is diminishing, as well as the level of operational mistakes. The question after today is very significant. There was a dream here from the perspective of those who managed the , [but] the pressure on the government did not work." In response, Brik argued, "Hamas still feels very strong. It is willing to give up homes and people who are killed, but it feels that we are not likely to topple it. Therefore, it uses cynical language, it does not want to reach an agreement on the hostages. They have time. To weaken their capabilities - it seems we are not approaching it. Hamas will continue to exist." Regarding the fighting in the Philadelphi Corridor and , Brik said, "The Philadelphi Corridor, we all know we have evacuations from Sinai under the corridor. The IDF did not want to sit along this corridor for the next few years because it did not have the power to do so and because there would be many casualties, so it hoped that the Egyptians would do it.  Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi inspects the Egyptian military units in Suez, as he told the media in his speech that Cairo is playing a very positive role in de-escalating the Gaza crisis, Egypt, October 25, 2023. (credit: THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENCY/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS) “But today, there is a very big problem with Egypt. They are not ready to do it in our place. They also do not agree for us to do it from this side of the corridor, and they threaten that if we start doing various things that will cause masses to cross into Sinai, then they will stop the peace. "Although it's a poor country, it's the strongest army in the Middle East today - 4,000 tanks, 2,000 modern ones, hundreds of the most advanced aircraft, and a navy of the best there is. Advertisement For years, they've been building highways into Sinai. We're the target. They're not building the army for anywhere else. This means one decision to cancel peace, they become an enemy state, and we don't even have a brigade to stand against it." ...قراءة المزيد

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